Should an interrogator's promise of confidentiality invalidate a suspect's Miranda waiver only if it immediately induces them to confess, or should it be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances?

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW This Court has long held that, for a suspect’s statement to be used against them at trial, when considering the totality of the circumstances, the suspect must have knowingly and voluntarily waived their Miranda rights. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725 (1979). Other jurisdictions universally apply the test. See e.g., People v. Salmon, 2022 IL 125722 978; State v. O.D.A.-C., 273 A. 8d 413, 421 (N.J. 2022). However, here, the Illinois Appellate Court ignored the test in deciding an issue of first impression — the impact a promise of confidentiality has on a suspect’s Miranda waiver. The court created a rule that a promise of confidentiality does not negate a suspect’s Miranda waiver unless it immediately induces a confession and acknowledged that many of the interrogators’ tactics, in addition to the promises of confidentiality, were problematic. However, it held that the suspect knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights because, individually, none of the problematic tactics invalidated his Miranda waiver. The court never analyzed the cumulative impact of the interrogators’ problematic tactics. Thus, the question is: Should an interrogator’s promise of confidentiality invalidate a suspect’s Miranda waiver only if it immediately induces them to confess, or should it be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances? i