In threat prosecutions where the defendant mounts a political-speech defense, may trial courts—consistent with the First Amendment—instruct the jury only about the meaning of unprotected 'true threats' and not about protected political speech?

QUESTION PRESENTED “True threats of violence, everyone agrees, lie outside the bounds of the First Amendment’s protection.” Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 72 (2023). By contrast, “dissenting political speech” lies “at the First Amendment’s core.” Id. at 81. In Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam), the Court explained that “[wlhat is a [true] threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected political speech.” Jd. at 707. The Court then held that an ostensible threat to shoot the President fell on the latter side of that line, emphasizing that violent rhetoric criticizing the government receives broad protection. Id. at 708. The question presented is: In threat prosecutions where the defendant mounts a political-speech defense, may trial courts—consistent with the First Amendment—instruct the jury only about the meaning of unprotected “true threats” and not about protected political speech? i