Clifford Laines, Jr. v. United States
Immigration
Does the 'maximum term of imprisonment... prescribed by law' for a prior state offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act's 'serious drug offense' definition refer to the statutory maximum sentence or the highest sentence the particular defendant could have received under the then-applicable state-sentencing regime?
QUESTION PRESENTED The Armed Career Criminal Act, or “ACCA,” mandates at least fifteen years’ imprisonment for federal firearm offenses where the defendant has three prior convictions for a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). “{SJerious drug offense” includes certain state offenses “for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” Id. § 92.4(e)(2)(A)(ii). The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have construed “maximum term of imprisonment... prescribed by law” to mean the highest sentence that the particular defendant actually faced under the then-applicable state-sentencing regime. In this regard, these circuits account for any state-sentencing law shown in the record of conviction to have governed that defendant’s sentence calculation. And importantly, this Court has employed this approach in at least one “serious drug offense” decision. The Eleventh Circuit, however, has expressly rejected this approach. It looks only to the statutory maximum sentence for offenses of the kind committed by the defendant. These competing approaches beg an important federal question: Does “maximum term of imprisonment .. . prescribed by law’—as used in the Armed Career Criminal Act to define “serious drug offenses” that are predicated on prior state convictions—refer to the statutory maximum sentence that the underlying state offense carried, or the highest sentence that the particular defendant actually could have received under the then-applicable state-sentencing regime? 1