Armando Orozco-Barron v. United States
ERISA JusticiabilityDoctri
Whether a court may extend the Speedy Trial Act's deadlines by general order, without individually evaluating defendants' interests in a speedy trial
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Under the Speedy Trial Act’s “ends of justice” provision, a court may extend the statute’s deadlines upon “finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Between March 2020 and March 2022, the Southern District of California’s Chief Judge invoked that provision to extend the Speedy Trial Act’s deadlines in every case in the district, effectively nullifying those deadlines and precluding defendants from moving to dismiss (even without prejudice). Though the district suspended trials for only about eight-and-a-half months, these exclusions lasted for almost two years. A divided Ninth Circuit panel held that these exclusions were valid, even while trials were occurring and even for detained defendants at heightened risk of death from COVID-19. The questions presented are: (1) May a Chief Judge extend the STA’s deadlines by general order, without individually evaluating defendants’ interests in a speedy trial? (2) When an exclusion is entered by general order, may a district court validate that exclusion by retroactively weighing the defendant’s speedy trial interests at the motion-to-dismiss hearing? prefix PARTIES,