Can a fundamental change in decisional law independently support relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6)?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), permits the Commission to obtain a “permanent injunction” in court to stop violations of the Act while the Commission pursues administrative proceedings under Section 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). For decades, the Commission relied on this “permanent injunction” provision to bypass administrative proceedings and obtain compensatory equitable remedies for violations of the Act directly in court. This interpretation, which had been accepted by nearly all the lower federal courts, was rejected in AMG Capital Management, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission, 593 U.S. 67 (2021). Despite AMG Capital, the Commission continues to bypass administrative proceedings; it does so by seeking and obtaining compensatory equitable remedies in court as sanctions for civil contempt of Section 13(b) permanent injunctions. The lower federal courts are uniformly rejecting AMG Capital as a basis for relief from such contempt judgments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). The questions presented are: 1. Can a fundamental change in decisional law independently support relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b) (6)? 2. Can the Federal Trade Commission obtain compensatory equitable remedies as sanctions for civil contempt of a Section 13(b) permanent injunction when those remedies are not directly available under Section 13(b)?