Did the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals and the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan apply the wrong standard to a new job applicant under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), by misapplying case precedents for a return to work, last known as disabled, former 'employee' job applicants?

QUESTION PRESENTED Did the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals [Appeals Court] and the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (US District Court) apply the wrong standard to a new job applicant under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), by misapplying case precedents for a: return to work, last known as disabled, former “employee” job applicants ? Preamble: As regards the Americans with Disabilities Act, as stated in Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 677 (1st Cir. 1995), ‘neither Congress nor the EEOC took into account the case of a returning employee when formulating the restrictions on pre-offer inquiries” of job applicants. A worker could simultaneously be covered under two statutes: both as a job applicant and an employee. Thus it is first necessary: @ to determine the subclass of job applicant that the case law precedents applied to, and e the origination of the statutory authority for making “medical inquiries” of treating physicians for this subclass. This is necessary in order to determine if the Judge-Made case law applied to McBratnie, or only Statute 42 USC §12112(d)(2) as written. Simply stated: was the medical inquiry that was allowed in the case precedents, authorized by the job applicant standard 42 USC §12112(d)(2) or the employee standard 42 USC §12112(d)(4) ? ii . The case precedent of Grenier, only identifies that 42 USC §12112(d)(2) is not violated by a medical inquiry of a treating provider. It does not specifically identify where the authority to make the medical inquiry originates, such as under 42 USC §12112(d)(4) the employee standard. Articulated in Grenier, supra p.677: was “agree{ment] that [Grenier s] case is similar to that of an employee returning from disability leave.” Also articulated in Grenier, supra p.678: In sum, an employer does not violate Section(s) 12112(d)(2) of the ADA by requiring a former employee with a recent known disability applying for re-employment to provide medical certification as to ability to return to work with or without reasonable accommodation, and as to the type of any reasonable accommodation necessary, as long as it is relevant to the assessment of ability to perform essential job functions. Additional Questions For the case of McBratnie: e If the above medical inquiry was authorized by the employee “business necessity” standard of 42 USC §12112(d)(4), and McBratnie was not a former employee but an outside new-hire job applicant, would “medical inquiries of physicians” still be allowed ? e If the above medical inquiry was authorized based upon employer foreknowledge of disability status and McBratnie’s disability status was unknown, would “medical inquiries of physicians” still be allowed ? e For the case precedents cited, medical inquiries were to be made of “treating providers” who already had knowledge of the former employee job applicant. Can a medical inquiry be made of a physician that is not a treating provider without entailing a medical exam to inform such opinion? Are all inquiries of physicians equal, or dependent on their pre-existing relationship to the job applicant (treating versus non-treating provider) ? The US Supreme Court has become the Court of last resort for supervisory powers. iii ‘