Whether the Fair Housing Amendments Act requires a housing provider to have knowledge of a disability at the time of an initial denial of a reasonable accommodation request, or whether liability may be established based on knowledge acquired through subsequent formal notice of the disability and continued refusal to accommodate

No question identified. : APPLICATION To the Honorable Samuel Alito, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit: Pursuant to Rule 13.5 of the Rules of this Court and 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c), applicant Carolyn Frost Keenan respectfully requests a 32-day extension of time, to and including September 18, 2023, within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas in this case. 1. The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas (the First Court) entered judgment on March 17, 2022. See Keenan v. River Oaks Property Owners, Inc., No. 01-20-00493-CV, 2022 WL 802989, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 1800 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 17, 2022, pet. denied). (Exhibit 1). Keenan timely filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court of Texas, which that court denied, and then filed a motion for rehearing in that court, which that court denied on May 19, 2023. (Exhibits 2-3). On June 20, 2023, the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas entered an Order staying the issuance of the mandate from that court to allow Keenan to file a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court. (Exhibit 4). Thus, unless extended, the time to file a petition for certiorari will expire on August 17, 2023. This application is being filed more than ten days before a petition is currently due. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.5. The jurisdiction of this Court would be invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47, 52-53 (2015). 2. Keenan is the owner of a home in the well-known residential subdivision in Houston, Texas called River Oaks. The Respondent, River Oaks Property Owners, Inc. (ROPO), purports to be a statutory property owners’ association under the Texas Property Code with the power to enforce deed restrictions, among other powers. After her mother-in-law became wheelchair bound due to an age-related disability, Keenan requested that ROPO provide a reasonable accommodation to exceed an impermeable-cover deed restriction with a larger driveway for a van and ramp into the home. ROPO refused Keenan’s initial request for an accommodation and then later refused her attorney’s formal written request for the accommodation, which specifically cited to the Fair Housing Amendment Act (FHAA). 3. After Keenan proceeded to build the larger driveway despite ROPO’s repeated refusals to allow the accommodation, ROPO filed suit to enforce the deed restriction and to recover attorney’s fees for the alleged violation. Keenan later counterclaimed for a violation of the FHAA based on ROPO’s refusal to provide a reasonable accommodation notwithstanding the pre-suit request made by Keenan’s attorney. After years of litigation, including Keenan’s petition for writ of mandamus granted by the Supreme Court of Texas in Jn re Keenan, 501 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam), the trial court granted a final summary judgment in favor of ROPO on a claim requiring Keenan to remove 1,260 square feet from her driveway and other structures from her property and pay ROPO over $665,000.00 in attorneys’ fees. (Exhibit 5). Critically here, the judgment also disposed of Keenan’s FHAA claim, among others. (Exhibit 5). 4. In upholding the trial court’s judgment on Keenan’s FHAA counterclaim, the First Court concluded that “ROPO did not know, and could not have reasonably been expected to know, of a disability at the time that it denied Keenan’s requested accommodation.” See Keenan, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 1800, at *57 (emphasis in original) (quoting Groome Resources, Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 199 (5th Cir. 2000)). In reaching the conclusion that ROPO had to know of the claimed disability when Keenan initially requested an accommodation, the First Court misconstrued Groome, which held that “under the Fair Housing Act, a violation occurs when the disabled resident is first denied a reasonable accommodation, irr