Whether district courts may make factual and credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, and refuse to credit circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent in 42-U.S.C-1981-cases

QUESTION PRESENTED An issue of recurring, unresolved, national importance: The only way that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 can protect the rights of Blacks and other minorities to make and enforce contracts, to sue, to be parties in litigation, and to have and enjoy the same full and equal protection of all laws and proceedings that are enjoyed by white citizens is for district courts to grant summary judgment against them only in strictest compliance with the summaryjudgment standards—and only after taking into account all available evidence, in particular, all circumstantial evidence. After all, those who act to deprive Blacks and other minorities of their contract rights only rarely come out of the shadows and admit that they acted with discriminatory intent. Almost all cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 depend solely on circumstantial evidence. District courts must recognize that basic fact. District courts can deprive Blacks and minorities of their right to a jury trial in these unique cases only when, after having had the chance to consider all of the available circumstantial evidence, reasonable jurors could not find any discriminatory intent. This, then, is the issue: Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, may district courts do what the district court did here on summary judgment, which is to make factual and credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, and refuse to credit the circumstantial evidence that a reasonable jury could have relied on to find that racial discrimination was a substantial reason for impairing the contract rights of an energetic, talented, caring, and formerly successful Black businesswoman. u This Court has never addressed the exceptional importance of circumstantial evidence in establishing discriminatory intent in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 cases, and has therefore not provided sufficient guidance to federal courts tasked with interpreting and applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981’s protections. As a result, litigants such as Khamillia Harris have not had a fair chance to present the circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent to juries. This petition is an opportunity to correct that problem and protect the contract rights of Blacks and other minorities that was the congressional goal from 1866 to the present date.