Does a dismissal without prejudice that reestablishes the pre-suit status quo make a defendant the 'prevailing party' under fee-shifting statutes?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Copyright Act provides that a “court may... award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. In CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 578 U.S. 419 (2016), this Court held that “a defendant need not obtain a favorable judgment on the merits in order to be a ‘prevailing party” for purposes of statutory attorney’s fees, id. at 431, but “decline[d] to decide” whether “a defendant must obtain a preclusive judgment in order to prevail,” id. at 434. That important question has divided the circuits 7-3, and is cleanly presented in this copyright case: 1. Does a dismissal without prejudice that reestablishes the pre-suit status quo make a defendant the “prevailing party” under 17 U.S.C. §§ 505 and 1203(b)(5)? A further and related question left unaddressed in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981), is presented, and important to all civil litigants: 2. Is a final judgment of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, entered in response to a plaintiffs request under Rule 41(a)(2), a “judgment that [a plaintiff] finally obtains” for purposes of Rule 68? These questions provide related, defendant-based counterpoise to those now pending in Lackey v. Stinnie, 1448. Ct. 1890 (2024).