Did the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals err in its interpretation and application of Rule 37(e) sanctions by requiring multiple findings of intent, prejudice, and bad faith before granting evidentiary remedies?

question presented is: (1) Did the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals err by requiring both a finding of “prejudice” and “intentional destruction : indicating a desire to suppress the truth” before a : Rule 37(e)(2) remedy could be granted? (2) Did the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals eer by imposing an additional “bad faith” requirement on ‘the intent, thereby in effect creating a pronged test or alternative definition of intent for awarding a Rule , 37(e)(2) remedy? (8) Did the District Court eer by : effectively using a “clear and convincing” standard : rather : . @) than a “preponderance of the evidence” standard when determining the appropriateness of Rule 37(e)(1) or Rule 37 (e)(2) remedies. (4) Lastly, was a : sufficient FRCP Rule(e)(1) remedy of allowing : already permissible testimony, given to address the . prejudice Ms. Smith faced (due to the loss of electronically stored information (ESI) when Menards, Inc. cherry picked and chose to preserve only evidence to defend their side) a sufficient remedy. , (ui)