Whether the 'key role' standard adopted by the Second Circuit conflicts with the Supreme Court's 'crux' nexus test for criminal liability under the aggravated identity theft statute

QUESTION PRESENTED In Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 114 (2023), the Court narrowed the scope of the aggravated identity theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), and held that it only “is violated when the defendant’s misuse of another person’s means of identification is at the crux of what makes the underlying offense criminal... .” All the circuit courts to address the issue since have articulated the legal standard as Dubin does, and have agreed that the “crux” nexus test is Dubin’s core holding. The Second Circuit’s decision in Petitioner’s case is the one notable exception. Here, the panel held that identity theft need only play a “key role” in the criminal conduct to satisfy § 1028A(a). Pet. App. 9a. The Second Circuit’s outlier position has created a nascent circuit conflict. Moreover, the “key role” standard adopted in Petitioner’s case broadens the type of conduct that is subject to criminal liability. The question presented is the correct standard, under Dubin, for evaluating criminal liability pursuant to the aggravated identity theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). i