Whether Circuits have improperly applied categorical analysis to aiding and abetting's elements under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)'s force clause and misinterpreted the Hobbs Act robbery statute's requirements

question presented is whether Circuits have failed to apply categorical analysis to aiding and abetting’s distinct elements, which do not meet the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)’s force clause. Aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2, does not require as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use, of violent physical force under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)’s force clause. The Circuits confuse categorical analysis—which examines only statutory elements—with the contextually distinct rule that an aider and abettor is punishable for the acts of a principal. Thus, Circuits are not applying categorical analysis to aiding and abetting’s distinct elements and are failing to assume the least culpable conduct for aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery. The actus reus element of aiding and abetting merely requires the defendant to aid or abet one element of the substantive offense, and not every element of Hobbs Act robbery requires intentional violent force against a person or property. The second question presented is whether the Circuits have interpreted the actus reus of Hobbs Act robbery too narrowly and against its plain language by requiring violent physical force as an element. The Hobbs Act robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1), does not require as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use, of violent physical force. By its plain language, Hobbs Act robbery encompasses future threats to injure intangible property and does not require violent physical force. 1