Whether Circuits have failed to apply categorical analysis to aiding and abetting's distinct elements under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)'s force clause and whether Circuits have interpreted federal carjacking's actus reus too narrowly

question presented is whether Circuits have failed to apply categorical analysis to aiding and abetting’s distinct elements, which do not meet the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)’s force clause. Aiding and abetting carjacking, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119 and 2, does not require as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)’s force clause. The Circuits confuse categorical analysis—which examines only statutory elements—with the contextually distinct rule that an aider and abettor is punishable for the acts of a principal. Thus, Circuits are not applying categorical analysis to aiding and abetting’s distinct elements and are failing to assume the least culpable conduct for aiding and abetting carjacking. The actus reus element of aiding and abetting merely requires the defendant to aid or abet one element of the substantive offense, and not every element of carjacking requires intentional violent force. The second question presented is whether the Circuits interpreted the actus reus of federal carjacking too narrowly by providing that the threat of violent physical force constitutes an element of the offense. By its plain language, completed federal carjacking can be committed by “intimidation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2119. This Court recognizes carjacking by intimidation is satisfied by “an empty threat, or intimidating bluff.” Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 11 (1999). Thus, a defendant could be found guilty of carjacking by intimidation in a “case in which the driver surrendered or otherwise lost control over his car” without the defendant 1 ever using, attempting to use, or threatening to use physical force. Id. While the government must prove the defendant “would have at least attempted to seriously harm or kill the driver if that action had been necessary to complete the taking of the car,” the statute does not require the outward threat of such harm to obtain a carjacking conviction. Id. 3