Where there was suppressed exculpatory evidence, in the form of a proffer letter demonstrating that a key prosecution witness who provided significant, and the only direct, evidence of premeditation sufficient to support a first degree murder conviction was offered consideration for his 'attempts to cooperate with the State,' did the First Circuit err in denying habeas relief by finding that the State Court's 'no-prejudice determination' was not an unreasonable application of Brady?

| The purpose of Brady is to ensure that “criminal trials are fair,” Brady v. | Maryland, 373 U.S. 88, 87 (1963), and “that a miscarriage of justice does not occur,” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). Placing the burden on prosecutors to disclose information “illustrate[s] the special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 268, 281 (1999). The prosecution is trusted to turn over evidence to the defense because its interest “is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Id. (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). The prosecution in this case suppressed exculpatory material relating to a key prosecution witness in Etienne’s murder trial, Jose Gomez. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the first two Brady prongs were met: that the evidence was favorable to Etienne and suppressed by the State. The State Court, district court, and First Circuit found, however, that the final Brady prong, prejudice, was not satisfied. It was Gomez's unparalleled testimony that, if believed, established both motive and intent to commit first degree, premeditated murder as well as undermined Etienne’s claim, and only defense, that he acted in self-defense and defense of another. The suppressed exculpatory evidence, a proffer letter offering Gomez consideration for his attempts to cooperate with the State, would have, according to the State Court, “provided evidence that Gomez had attempted to cooperate with the State on the unrelated drug charges, and would | have supported the defendant’s assertion that Gomez had allegedly joined the prosecution’s team.” : ii | | | The question presented—which finds its basis in this Court’s clearly established precedent, involves an issue of growing national attention, and is an ; increasingly recurring issue—is as follows: . Where there was suppressed exculpatory evidence, in the form of a proffer letter demonstrating that a key prosecution witness who provided significant, and the only direct, evidence of premeditation sufficient to support a first degree murder conviction was offered consideration for his “attempts to cooperate with the State,” did the First Circuit err in denying habeas relief by finding that the State Court’s “no-prejudice determination” was not an unreasonable application of Brady? iti | | ;