Sasha Nicole Pringle v. Ricky D. Dixon, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
DueProcess FourthAmendment HabeasCorpus Securities
Whether a state habeas petitioner 'fairly presents' her federal claim when the petitioner raises the substance of a federal constitutional claim in state court that is coextensive and identical with a state constitutional claim
The Anti -terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 , provides that “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State. ” § 2254(b)(1)(A). In Picard v. Connor , this Court explained that the exhaustion standard both pre-dating and now codified in AEDPA requires that a “federal claim must be fairly presented to the state courts .” 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). While the exhaustion rule seems straightforward, the circuit courts have had much difficulty pinpoint ing the minimum requirements that a habeas petitioner must meet to satisfy Picard ’s exhaustion standard . This petition squarely presents the Court with an opportunity to clarify this confusion and address a question expressly left open in Baldwin v. Reese , 541 U.S. 27 (2004 ), about Picard ’s “fairly presented ” rule. The question presented is: Whether a state habeas petitioner “fairly presents ” her federal claim, thus exhausting that claim, when the petitioner raises the substance of a federal constitutional claim in state court that is coextensive and identical with a state constitutional claim.