Whether the D.C. Court of Appeals applied an overly vague and undefined standard for determining judicial bias and mandamus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)

are as follows: 1. Is the D.C. Court of Appeals “overpowering ” standard for determining the indisputability of §455 (a) claims of appearance of bias that do not claim an extrajudicial source too vague and undefined for application, and thus an unfair standard for determining “exceptional circumstances ” and a “clear and indisputable right ” to mandamus relief? 2. Must the D.C. Court of Appeals employ the “objective observer ” and and “favoritism or antagonism ” standards in determining whether to issue a writ of mandamus for Appellant ’s intrajudicial claims of bias that were made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)? 3. Must a judge consider each Motion to Disqualify separately in determining whether a basis exist for disqualification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)? 4. Did Respondent ’s conduct presented in Petitioner ’s Amended Opposed Motion to Disqualify Judge Donald W. Tunnage . and Second Opposed Motion to Disqualify Judge Donald W. Tunnage . qualify as conduct that might cause the average person, fully informed to reasonably question the Respondent ’s partiality, thus requiring Respondent ’s disqualification from proceedings, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)? ii