Whether a pro se litigant with documented severe mental illness is entitled to appointed counsel in a civil rights employment matter under Title VII when their disability hinders their ability to represent themselves

I. Whether a pro se litigant with documented severe mental illness is entitled to appointed counsel in a civil rights employment matter under Title VII when their disability hinders their ability to represent themselves. II. Whether a federal court may lawfully dismiss a subsequent Title VII claim based on a second EEOC right-to-sue letter involving different retaliatory acts, by treating it as duplicative of a prior charge without allowing the plaintiff to clarify distinctions or amend the pleadings. III. Whether equitable tolling should apply when a disabled plaintiff continued to engage in the administrative process in good faith, misunderstood deadlines due to mental illness, and was not permitted to amend or clarify her claims before dismissal with prejudice. IV. Whether a district court abuses its discretion and denies meaningful access to justice under the Due Process Clause and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) when it refuses to appoint counsel for a mentally ill, indigent pro se plaintiff pursuing a Title VII civil rights claim, where the complexity of the case and the plaintiffs condition render self-representation impossible. 3