Whether the First Amendment permits the government to require ordinary citizens to register and pay a fee to communicate with their government representatives

Seventy years ago, this Court in United States v. Harriss , 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954), held that Congress’s informational interest in “self -protection” justified federal lobbyist registration requirements. A crevasse has since developed between Harriss and this Court’s modern First Amendment jurisprudence. Although this Court has subsequently clarified that “political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence,” Citizens United v. FEC , 558 U.S. 310, 340 (201 0), governments nationwide continue to abuse Harriss to justify draconian speech and petitioning restrictions not just on professional lobbyists, but on ordinary citizens . Chapter 305 of the Texas Government Code is a paradigmatic example. It requires ordinary citizens to register , make burdensome disclosures, and pay a substantial fee to speak to government officials about political issues that matter to their families, their communities, and their livelihoods . Failure to register is punishable by massive fines and up to one year of jailtime. Chapter 305 was enforced in this case to impose a $10,000 fine on Petitioner Michael Quinn Sullivan for failure to register and pay the required fee before sending mass emails to legislators about concerns relevant to his job as the leader of a small nonprofit organization . The question presented is whether —and if so, under what circumstances —the First Amendment permits the government to require ordinary citizens to register and pay a fee to communicate with their government representatives .