Whether the SEC can seek disgorgement for investor clients who suffered no pecuniary harm under securities law anti-fraud provisions

The questions presented in this case are: 1. Whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) can seek, and the courts are authorized, under 15 U.S.C. §78u(d)(5) or §78u(d)(7) or Liu v. SEC 591 U.S. 71 (2020), to award disgorgement for investor “ victim” clients who suffered no pecuniary harm as a result of their investment adviser’s violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal security statutes, including 15 U.S.C. §80b-6(1), (2)? 2. Whether this Court’s holdings in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. 375 U.S. 180, 193, n. 39 (1963) and its progeny TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438 (1976) and Basic Inc. v. Levinson 485 U.S. 224   determining whether an alleged misrepresentation or omission is “material” in “face-to-face” (as opposed to class action “fraud on the market”) securities law anti-fraud violation civil enforcement cases, including §206(1), (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. §80b-6(1), (2)] violation cases, the SEC must prove that the investor(s) actually relied on the misrepresentation or omission and of non-reliance, the materiality issue must be determined by a jury, not by a judge by summary judgment?