Whether the rule in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. regarding state action through willful participation is still controlling law, and how federal employee actions are attributed to the state under 42 U.S.C. §1983

1. Is the rule expressed in Lugar v Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct.2744, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1982), that a challenged activity is deemed state action when it results from “willful participation with the State or its agents”, still controlling law, or is the rule now, as determined by the Fifth Circuit, that “willful participation alone is insufficient ”, that a plaintiff must plead “facts showing an agreement between the state actor and the private actor to engage in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of a constitu tional right, and that the privat e actor was a willing participant in joint activity with the state or its agents”? 2. In an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, is the deter mination of whether an individual ’s acts are fairly attributable to the State different for federal employees simply by virtue of their employment, or does the source of authority for the individual’s act control rather than the identity of the individual’s employer? 3. In determining when the acts of a federal employee are fairly attributable to the State, does the source of authority for the acts of a federal employee emanate from “ a person for whom the State is responsible ” if, and only if , there is an agreement between the federal employee and State official to conspire to deprive an individual of constitutional rights? 4. Are courts at liberty to judicially legislate some form of policy -based presumption for federal officials in an action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, not available for any other nonstate actor, that to be deemed acting under the color of state law there must be an agreement to conspire with the state offic ials to deprive an ii individual of constitutional rights in addition to joint participation with the state officials? 5. If a federal officer willingly participates in a local law enforcement activity in a search -and-seizure context, but is deemed to be acting under federal law, does Bivens remain a continued force and fixed principle of law in the sphere of law enforcement as admonished in Ziglar v. Abbasi , 582 U.S. 120, 134, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 18561857, 198 L. Ed. 2d 290, 308, (2017)? iii PARTIES TO AND LIST OF THE PROCEEDINGS The