No. 24A145

Ronald Hittle v. City of Stockton, California, et al.

Lower Court: Ninth Circuit
Docketed: 2024-08-07
Status: Presumed Complete
Type: A
Experienced Counsel
Tags: bostock-standard but-for-causation mcdonnell-douglas-framework religious-discrimination summary-judgment title-vii
Latest Conference: N/A
Question Presented (from Petition)

1. This case raises an important issue regarding the summary judgment standard in Title VII actions after Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 590 U.S. 644 (2020). The Ninth Circuit and other courts of appeals continue to require that Title VII plaintiffs prove the employer's proffered reasons for termination are pretextual, even though this conflicts with Bostock's description of Title VII's but-for causation standard. As this Court explained, "[w]hen it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision. So long as the plaintiff's sex was one but-for cause of that decision, that is enough to trigger the law." Id. at 656. The employee's protected status "need not be the sole or primary cause of the employer's adverse action." Id. at 665.

The continued use of the McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting framework causes courts to improperly apply the summary judgment standard. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In particular, the third step of the McDonnell-Douglas framework requires the plaintiff to show that the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual. This step cannot be squared with Bostock. The McDonnell Douglas framework causes courts to fail to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and places undue focus on whether the Title VII plaintiff has disproved the employer's proffered reasons, though that is plainly not required. Instead, courts should inquire only whether the plaintiff presented evidence that a discriminatory reason more likely than not caused or motivated his termination.

2. In this case, Fire Chief Ronald Hittle was terminated by the City of Stockton, California for attending on City time a leadership training conference that included a Christian perspective. During his employment, the City also demonstrated hostility toward Chief Hittle's religion by accusing him of being part of a "church clique" and "Christian coalition." Chief Hittle sued, alleging the City fired him because of his religion in violation of, inter alia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, denied Chief Hittle's motion for summary judgment, and entered judgment in favor of the City. Hittle v. City of Stockton, No. 2:12-CV-00766-TLN-KJN, 2022 WL 616722, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2022).

Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether the McDonnell Douglas framework for summary judgment in Title VII cases improperly conflicts with the but-for causation standard established in Bostock v. Clayton County by requiring plaintiffs to disprove an employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons

Docket Entries

2024-08-07
Application (24A145) granted by Justice Kagan extending the time to file until October 14, 2024.
2024-08-05
Application (24A145) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from August 15, 2024 to October 14, 2024, submitted to Justice Kagan.

Attorneys

Ronald Hittle
Aaron Michael StreettBaker Botts, L.L.P., Petitioner