Whether a regulatory takings claim is ripe for judicial review when the government's land-use restrictions unambiguously preclude all economically beneficial use of private property without requiring the landowner to seek a futile permit application

No question identified. : 1 APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME Under this Court’s Rule 13.5, Applicant Fane Lozman respectfully requests a 30-day extension of time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari, to and including February 13 , 202 5. JUDGMENT FOR WHICH REVIEW IS SOUGHT The judgment for which review is sought is Fane Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach , 119 F.4th 913 (11th Cir. 2024) (attached as Exhibit 1). JURISDICTION This Court will have jurisdiction over any timely petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). The Eleventh Circuit issued its judgment on October 16 , 2024, so a petition is currently due by January 14, 2025. T his application is being filed more than 10 days before that date. REASONS JUSTIFYING AN EXTENSION OF TIME 1. This case —like Mr. Lozman’s prior cases before this Court, see Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach , 585 U.S. 87, 91 (2018) ; Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach , 568 U.S. 115, 118 (2013) —raises important question s of federal law that have divided lower courts. And like those prior cases, this one arises from Mr. Lozman’s long running dispute with the City of Riviera Beach . Mr. Lozman first moved to the City in 2006, taking up residence in a floating home on the City’s marina. After several failed attempts to evict Mr. Lozman, the City brought suit under federal admiralty law , which led to this Court’s ruling that Mr. Lozman’s floating home was not a “vessel .” 568 U.S. at 120. While that case was 2 progressing , Mr. Lozman was arrested after a city council meeting where he criticized local officials. When Mr. Lozman sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this Court held that whether probable cause supported the arrest was irrelevant to his First Amendment retaliation claim , vacating the judgment against him. See 585 U.S. at 101– 02. The current case arises from the City’s taking of Mr. Lozman’s private property. Mr. Lozman purchased a parcel of waterfront land i n the City in 2014, hoping to develop it for single -family homes , as nearby land has been developed. But thanks to a series of shifting local zoning and land -use restrictions, he cannot develop the land for this purpose —or any other. He thus brought suit against the City, alleging that it had deprived him of all economically beneficial or productive use of his property under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council , 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The Eleventh Circuit held this suit unripe because Mr. Lozman had not sought a permit, variance, or rezoning for his property . Ex. 1 at 8 –9. The court relied on the rule that a regulatory takings claim is not ripe for judicial review “until the government entity charged with implementing the regulation[] has reach ed a final decision regarding the application of the regulation[] to the property at issue.” Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City , 473 U.S. 172 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Knick v. Twp. of Scott , 588 U.S. 180 (201 9). The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that , under the City’s governing regulations, the sole permissible use of this property is crystal clear: It can be used to build “[p]rivate residential fishing or viewing platforms and docks for non -motorized boats, ” and nothing else. Even so, the court held that Mr. Lozman should have “ sought a permit 3 to develop his land ” to “ understand the nature and extent of permitted development for his Lucas claim .” Ex. 1 at 10 –12. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision raises two i mportant questions. First , the Eleventh Circuit’s approach conflicts with decisions from other circuits , which recognize that a takings claim is ripe “ where ‘the granting authority has dug in its heels and made it transparently clear that the permit, application or no, will not be forthcoming.’” Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87, 93 n.5 (1st Cir. 2003) ; see also Murphy v. New Milf ord Zoning Comm ’n, 402 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A property owner ‘need not pursue such applications when a z