Whether strict scrutiny applies to a discretionary scheme that turns on whether individuals follow organized religion and whether their personal religious beliefs differ from the beliefs of their religious leaders

Petitioners are hardworkin g public educators who were pushed out of their jobs because of their religious beliefs. Respondents impl emented a post-pandemic vaccine mandate that denied religious accommoda-tions to educators like Petitioners with “personal” re-ligious beliefs or whose religious leaders had “publicly” endorsed vaccination, while granting accommodations to those affiliated with other “established religious organizations.” Under this discriminatory scheme, Christian Scientists received automatic ac-commodation while Catholics were ineligible. The Second Circuit initially rejected this discriminatory approach, mandatin g a “fresh review” under Title VII and local nondiscrimination standards. But City officials just reaffirmed the original denials, con-tinuing to deny beliefs as “too personal” and alternatively claiming it would be an undue hardship to accommodate anyone. This resulted in more unconstitu-tional discrimination: Unlike those accommodated under the original policy, Petitioners had to prove no undue hardship. The court below rubber-stamped this discrimination under rational-basis review, dissolving a unani-mous circuit consensus that applies strict scrutiny to similar discretionary accommodation schemes. The question presented is: Whether strict scrutiny applies to a discretionary scheme that turns on whether individuals follow organized religion and whether their personal religious beliefs differ from the beliefs of their religious leaders.