Does a private plaintiff have standing to enforce antitrust laws when the primary purpose of its business is to facilitate unlawful activity by others?

Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for a private right of action and treble damages to “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.” 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). Despite that broad language, this Court has recognized that Congress did not intend antitrust law to provide damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation. Consequently, federal courts have developed limitations, including those contemplated by the concept of “antitrust standing,” on the right to pursue a private action for treble damages. One such limitation is the requirement that a private plaintiff must suffer an “antitrust injury”— that is, an injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. The question presented by this case, which is critically important to the development and administration of federal antitrust law, is: Does a private plaintiff have standing to enforce antitrust laws when the primary purpose of its business is to facilitate unlawful activity by others?