Whether a state court's application of summary judgment standards violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by excluding qualified expert affidavits and whether failure to provide clear notice to a pro se litigant of summary judgment affidavit requirements violates due process

1. Whether a state court’s application of summary judgment standards, by excluding qualified expert affidavits through credibility assessments rather than admissibility determinations, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by denying a fair trial, in conflict with federal appellate decisions, such as City of Pomona v. SQM North America Corp. , 750 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2014), and Supreme Court precedent, such as Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 2. Whether a state court’s failure to provide clear notice to a pro se litigant of summary judgment affidavit requirements, including the need to oppose all facts including the standard of care, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in light of divergent circuit approaches mandating notice for all pro se litigants ( Vital v. Interfaith Medical Center , 168 F.3d 615 (2d Cir. 1999); Roseboro v. Garrison , 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975); Timms v. Frank , 953 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1992); Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. One Colt Python .357 Cal. Revolver , 845 F.2d 287 (11th Cir. 1988)), denying mandatory notice for non-prisoners ( Jacobsen v. Filler , 790 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986); Brock v. Hendershott , 840 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1988)), or applying discretionary standards ( Renchenski v. Williams , 622 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2010); Murrell v. Bennett , 615 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1980); Neal v. Kelly , 963 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1992)), necessitating uniform due process standards..