Did the Court create conflicts in the law by failing to be guided by the common-law rule, well-established public policy and the long legal tradition protecting an employee's decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment?

Did the Court create conflicts in the law by failing to be guided by the common-law rule, well-established public policy and the long legal tradition protecting an employee ’s, or any competent person ’s, decision to refuse any unwanted medical treatment ? Did the Court create conflicts in law, pursuant to recent Supreme Court authority, by allowing a private employer, which is not the Department of Health, to require compulsory treatment purposed for the health benefit of the person treated —as opposed to compulsory treatment for the health benefit of others — which implicates the fundamental right to refuse a medical treatment based on medical privacy and informed consent as echoed in the statutes presented? Did the Court err by failing to consider that an employer violates the ADA ’s prohibition on discriminatory qualification standards when it imposes a “non-jobrelated ” medical treatment, as a condition for employment, on an employee who has not been diagnosed, or individually assessed, as a “direct threat ” and the employee has challenged the employer ’s compliance on this issue? Did the Court abuse its discretion by failing to consider the Congressional intent and standard of review for ADA pleadings by failing to review defendant ’s compliance or review it’s response to determine if it expressed any viable ADA defense? Is the Court required to have a covered employer show, particularly when challenged, that the new “COVID policy ” qualification standards for employment -i are both “job-related ” for the position in question and consistent with “business necessity ” so that the new standards do not result in prohibited actions for all employees not just those diagnosed with an actual disability? Did the Court abuse its discretion by refusing to properly analyze whether certain “COVID policy ” medical treatments and medical tests qualify as “non-jobrelated ” qualification standards which are prohibited for all employees not just those diagnosed with an actual disability? Is the Court biased and abusing its discretion by arbitrarily refusing to accept plaintiffs sufficiently alleged facts as true when it dismisses Conard ’s complaint claiming that plaintiff failed to “plausibly allege ” facts in her complaint; thus implementing a higher pleading standard for a pro se plaintiff while the Court has adopted nearly the same discriminatory policies and practices which gave rise to plaintiffs complaint? Details are outlined in the