No. 25-537

Raymond H. Pierson, III v. Phyliss M. Rushing

Lower Court: California
Docketed: 2025-11-04
Status: Denied
Type: Paid
Tags: constitutional-rights due-process equal-protection fourteenth-amendment insurance-litigation medical-emergency
Key Terms:
Privacy JusticiabilityDoctri
Latest Conference: 2026-01-09
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether a self-represented party suffering a medical emergency can be denied due process and have their case dismissed for failing to appear at trial

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

Petitioner Dr. Pierson was acutely stricken by the emergent development of an acute life threatening cardiac condition which required immediate hospi talization for an emergency cardiac surgery procedure at the Stanford University Medical Center. Despite having been presented with the evidence of Dr. Pierson ’s life-threatening cardiac condition requiring emergency cardiac surgical intervention and having been provided with the opportunity to speak with Dr. Pierson ’s Stanford Cardiac physicians, the Amador County trial court concluded that Dr. Pierson ’s absence was “willful ” and the trial court proceeded to dismiss the case. The underlying matter involves Phyliss Rushing driving her car into and destroying Dr. Pierson ’s med ical office. The insurer, CSAA Insurances Services et al. refused to settle. Pierson sought to bring suit against the insurance company; however the trial court only permitted the case to be styled with Rushing as the Defendant, contrary to Cal. Code. Civ. P. 1559 which states “A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it.” Well-estab lished early Court precedents [Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394, Hn. 4 (1886) and Gulf, C. & S.F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897)] recognized that “corporations are persons within the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. ” The Questions Presented are : Question 1 la. Isn ’t it true that under the Fifth and Four teenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, that Dr. Pierson, a self-represented party without alternative 11 legal counsel then available, was entitled to due process and equal protection to advance and protect his property interests and rights in a court of justice before a jury of his peers without the Amador Trial Court holding those fundamental rights and liberty interests hostage to the extreme demand that Dr. Pierson must refuse to pursue the required emergency medical evaluation and treatment, but must alterna tively be in attendance at trial at grave risk of perm anent health injury and possibly even death? lb. Furthermore, isn’t it true that the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution makes it unlawful and unconstitutional for any state court to deprive a U.S. citizen of those essential and fundamental rights and liberty interests protected by the U.S. Constitution as to all citizens of this Republic? Question 2 2a. Isn ’t it true that the denial of that right to Dr. Pierson caused by the trial court ’s immediate and unlawful dismissal of the case when Dr. Pierson was unable to attend the first day of trial as a self-repre sented party due to the exceptional good cause of an acute cardiac health emergency represents an absolutely intolerable and extreme deprivation of fundamental California and U.S. constitutionally protected rights and liberty interests that is completely alien to this Nation ’s Rule of law? 2b. Furthermore, isn’t it true that such an example of gulag justice, which is unknown to our system of justice and the rule of law, has caused an exceptional and intolerable injustice to deprive Dr. Pierson, the only injured party here, of his essential and fundamen tal rights which requires and even demands immediate iii correction with the establishment of an unassailable case precedent which insures that no such injury is ever again perpetrated upon a U.S. citizen? Question 3 3a. Isn ’t it true that when an Insurer ’s involvement and contractually demanded complete control over the entirety of litigation which arises from an insured ’s neg ligent act(s) where that control far extends well beyond the provision of simple indemnification of the insured to exclusively involve the insurer ’s preferential management of the litigation to ameliorate its own financial risk and liability that exist in the case, the definition of those circumstances where that Insurer, a citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment, passes through

Docket Entries

2026-01-12
Petition DENIED.
2025-12-23
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 1/9/2026.
2025-05-30
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due December 4, 2025)
2025-03-26
Application (24A914) granted by Justice Kagan extending the time to file until May 30, 2025.
2025-03-20
Application (24A914) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from March 31, 2025 to May 30, 2025, submitted to Justice Kagan.

Attorneys

Raymond H. Pierson
Raymond H. Pierson II — Petitioner
Raymond H. Pierson II — Petitioner