Whether the term 'injury' in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) requires intent to invade a legally protected interest or merely denotes harm, and whether a debt from intentional tort is nondischargeable when the debtor genuinely believed their conduct was lawful

The Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge any debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). In Kawaauhau v. Geiger , 523 U.S. 57 (1998), this Court unanimously held that this exception covers only acts done with the actual intent to cause injury, anchoring its analysis in the law of intentional torts. The Restatement (Second) of Torts distinguishes “injury,” the invasion of a legally protected interest, from “harm,” the existence of loss or detriment in fact. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7(1) & cmt. a (1965). By using the terms interchangeably, the federal courts of appeals have fractured into distinct camps regarding the meaning of “injury” and whether a debtor’s subjective belief that his conduct was lawful negates the intent to injure. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the term “injury” in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) denotes mere “harm” (detriment in fact), as the Eleventh Circuit held, or requires the intent to invade a legally protected interest (legal injury), such that a debtor who intentionally causes harm under a genuine but mistaken belief of legal justification has not inflicted a “willful” injury. 2. Whether a debt arising from the intentional tort of false imprisonment is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) when the debtor held a subjective, genuine belief that confinement would be lawful and justified, or whether a court may obviate that subjective belief by defining the “injury” as the confinement itself and implying malice from the objective “excessiveness” of the debtor’s conduct.