1. In Moore et Ux v. United States, 602 U.S. 572 (2024), this Supreme Court held that the federal personal income tax is an indirect tax under authority of Article I, Section 8, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution.

2. In Moore the court held that all direct taxes must be apportioned to the several states for payment in proportion to the last census as required under the Constitution by Article I, Section 2, clause 3 and Article I, Section 9, clause 4.

3. The federal personal income tax is not a non-apportioned direct tax on income under the 16th Amendment.

4. The case record shows the district court erroneously claimed a subject-matter jurisdiction under the 16th Amendment to enforce a non-apportioned direct tax on income against the individual person of Cromar.

5. Under the Constitution and Moore the federal courts lack the subject-matter jurisdiction to conduct tax trials of individuals to enforce against them the payment of a "non-apportioned direct tax" on their own income under an alleged authority of the 16th Amendment to tax directly and without limitation.

6. The Circuit Court erred in its Judgment by stating: "since ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, whether an income tax is a direct tax or indirect tax is immaterial. " It further erred in asserting that: "It is beyond dispute that 'Congress has the power to tax the income of individuals ' ", as Article I, Section 8, clause 1 does not authorize any such direct and unavoidable taxation of the citizens in the fifty states.

7. No admissible "prima facie " evidence of tax under IRC Sections 6201, 6020(b), and 6020(b)(2), that was "good and sufficient " in court "for all legal purposes ", was presented at trial sufficient to support a conviction of the defendant under Section 7201.

8. The Chevron doctrine of "regulatory deference " has been overturned by Loper-Light v. Raimondo, 603 US 369 (2024), which means a liability for tax cannot be determined, and tax assessments cannot be made, using only regulations that operate outside of and beyond the actual authorities specified in the underlying controlling statutes of Sections 1 and 6020(b)(2).

9. No seizure of property occurred under authority of a Title 26 statute to support an alleged violation of Section 7212(b) [Count 3] because IRC Section 7403 is not a statute that authorizes a "seizure " of property, only the filing of a civil action.

10. The "United States " is not a statutory "person " under Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2510 that is eligible for restitution in a personal income tax case and is not entitled to restitution from an individual for any direct tax on their own income.

Whether the federal personal income tax is a non-apportioned direct tax requiring apportionment under the Constitution, and whether federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce income tax assessments against individuals absent valid prima facie evidence and statutory authority for seizure