1. Structural error and remedy after Collins. This Court's precedents treat structural defects in agency adjudications —such as Appointments Clause violations —as warranting automatic or strongly presumptive relief, including a new hearing before a proper adjudicator, without a granular showing that the outcome would have differed. See Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. 237 (2018); Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995). After Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220 (2021), some courts now require litigants challenging ALJ removal protections to prove that the unconstitutional insulation caused a different outcome in their specific case before any relief is available. In the adjudicatory context, where evidence of such a causal chain is effectively inaccessible, does Article II permit courts to deny any remedy for an unconstitutional multilevel removal scheme absent outcome-determinative proof of harm, or should prejudice be presumed (or assessed under a lower "realistic possibility" standard with the burden on the Government) in ALJ-removal cases seeking a new hearing as the remedy?

Relying on Collins as interpreted in NLRB v. Starbucks Corp., 125 F.4th 78 (3d Cir. 2024), and CFPB v. National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust, 96 F.4th 599 (3d Cir. 2024), the Third Circuit held that Petitioner "cannot bring" a removal-protection challenge at all unless he first shows a "causal link" between the removal defect and an actual injury. Did the court err by treating Collins's harm discussion as a threshold bar to even raising a structural Article II claim, rather than as a remedial question once a violation is found?

2. Sanction and public interest. DEA revoked Petitioner's registration as inconsistent with the public interest based on brief lapses in a state-law supervision-agreement requirement, without findings of diversion, abuse, or actual patient harm, and despite evidence that Petitioner provides specialized psychiatric care not easily replaced. The Third Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that unintentional misconduct can justify revocation and that DEA may find the public interest unmet "even when a harm has not yet been realized." Does the Controlled Substances Act permit revocation in such circumstances without meaningful consideration of diversion or harm and the clinical consequences of severing treatment?

Whether courts must require outcome-determinative proof of harm to grant relief for unconstitutional removal protections in agency adjudications, or whether prejudice should be presumed under Article II; and whether the Controlled Substances Act permits DEA revocation of a practitioner's registration based on technical violations without findings of diversion, abuse, or actual patient harm