Did the Ninth Circuit err in defining the qualified immunity right at issue too broadly by holding this was an 'obvious' case?

1. This Court has never applied the obvious case exception to qualified immunity’s second prong in the Fourth Amendment context. Although the Court has recognized its potential application, it has repeatedly cautioned against its use on an excessive force claim. Despite this, the Ninth Circuit applied the obvious case exception to reverse the grant of summary judgment in Deputy Matthew Farney’s favor on Respondent’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. Did the Ninth Circuit err in de fining the qualified immunity right at issue too broadly by holding this was an “obvious” case? 2a. The Ninth Circuit holds that when there is only a single surviving officer witness to a deadly force encounter, it “must also look at the circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend to discredit the police officer’s story, and consider whether this evidence could convince a rational factfinder that the officer acted unreasonably.” Scott v. Henrich , 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994). Did the Ninth Circuit err in requiring a higher degree of scrutiny for a defendant officer’s unopposed sworn testimony at summary judgment when he is the only surviving witness to a deadly force encounter despite the defendant officer not having the burden of proof at trial? 2b. Even assuming a higher degree of scrutiny is appropriate, did the Ninth Circuit err in holding that purported discrepancies in an officer’s testimony created an issue of material fact sufficient to disregard the officer’s sworn testimony on why force was necessary even though those di screpancies did not address the officer’s decision to use deadly force?