Philip G. Potter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach, New York, et al.
SocialSecurity DueProcess Takings JusticiabilityDoctri
Whether the statute of limitations for a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 begins to run only after state proceedings challenging a property deprivation have concluded
No question identified. : August 11, 2025. See this Court’s Rule 13.8. Under this Court’s Rule 13.5, this application is being filed at least 10 days before that deadline. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1). A copy of the court of appeals’ opinion is attached as Exhibit A, and a copy of the order denying rehearing is attached as Exhibit B. There is good cause for the extension. Counsel of record was retained only after the petition for rehearing had been filed in the Second Circuit. In addition, counsel has been heavily engaged with the press of other matters and requires additional time to prepare the petition. 1. Just two Terms ago, this Court held that the statute of limitations for a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. $1983 begins to run “only when ‘the State fails to provide due process’” for the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right—that is, when the allegedly inadequate state proceedings conclude. Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236 (2023). If such claims accrued as soon as the State first deprived the plaintiff of “life, liberty, or property,” litigants would be forced to “pursue relief in the state system and simultaneously file a protective federal § 1983 suit challenging that ongoing state process.” Id. at 236-237. Such “parallel litigation would ‘run counter to core principles of federalism, comity, consistency, and judicial economy.” Ibid. Yet at least five circuits continue to apply the very rule this Court rejected to procedural due process claims in land-use cases, including this one. 2. This case arises from a more than decade-long property dispute that the district court appropriately described as Sisyphean. In 2010, the Village of Ocean Beach, New York issued Applicant Philip G. Potter a permanent Certificate of Occupancy for his residence. Ex. A at 2. A year later, in July 2011, the Village Building Inspector sent Potter a letter purporting to revoke that Certificate of Occupancy without notice or an opportunity to contest the revocation. Id. at 5. That was just the beginning. In 2012, the Village issued criminal citations against Potter for violations of the Village building code—all of which related to conditions permitted under his Certificate of Occupancy. Dist. Ct. Dkt. 15 1951, 63 (E.D.N.Y.). When Potter moved to dismiss the charges, the Village prosecutor admitted that he could not, “‘in all good faith,’” oppose the motion because the Village “did issue a Certificate of Occupancy.” Jd. 162 (emphasis omitted). 299 In 2014, the Village convened a “‘revocation hearing’” to determine whether to revoke the Certificate of Occupancy the Village’s Building Inspector had purported to revoke three years earlier. Dist. Ct. Dkt. 15 166. That hearing culminated in a recommendation that the Village Board of Trustees revoke Potter’s Certificate of Occupancy. Jd. 170. But the Board never voted on that recommendation, instead tabling it indefinitely over a year later in 2015. Id. 172. Despite admitting that Potter had a valid Certificate of Occupancy and then tabling a resolution to revoke it, the Village denied Potter’s applications for rental permits in 2016, 2017, and 2018—specifically citing the purported absence of a valid Certificate in its decision to deny the 2017 request. Dist. Ct. Dkt. 15 177; Dist. Ct. Dkt. 15-13, at 2. In 2020, unable to occupy, rent, or sell his residence without threat of prosecution, Potter brought a state-court proceeding seeking a declaration that his Certificate of Occupancy remained valid. Dist. Ct. Dkt. 15 181. The state court dismissed the action as “premature,” finding that the Village had “failed to make a final determination as to the revocation of the [Certificate] and that Potter had not “exhausted” his “administrative remedies.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. 15-15, at 3. The court directed the Village to hold a hearing and determine “whether or not to revoke the [Certificate].” Zbid. That never happened. Despite the state court’s ruling that Potter’