Whether a pro se litigant's notice of removal can satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) requirements without explicitly citing the statute when federal civil rights and racial discrimination claims are present

No question identified. : APPLICATION To the Honorable Amy Coney Barrett, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and Circuit Justice for the Seventh Circuit: Pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 13(5), 22, and 30, Applicant Marissa Girard respectfully requests a 30-day extension of time, to and including December 5, 2025, within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in this matter. The Seventh Circuit issued its published decision and judgment on July 21, 2025 (Exhibit A) and denied Applicant’s timely petition for panel rehearing on August 7, 2025 (Exhibit B). The jurisdiction of this Court will be invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), and the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari will expire without an extension on November 5, 2025. This application is timely because it has been filed more than ten days prior to the date on which the time for filing the petition for certiorari is to expire. In support of this request, Applicant states as follows: BACKGROUND This case arises from illegal retaliation undertaken by state officials in Cook County, Illinois, against the Applicant (who is Hispanic/Latinx and suffers from two qualifying disabilities recognized under the Americans with Disabilities Act) after she filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1988 civil rights lawsuit (Girard v. Fernandez et al., Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00136, N. Dist. Illinois) against various Cook County judges, Cook County personnel and private attorneys for inter alia violating her civil rights by discriminating against her on the basis of her race and her disabilities, and violating her constitutional rights by sustaining her involvement in a seemingly never-ending and statute-violating’ custody proceeding incepted by Applicant’s husband’s ex-wife Jane F. Girard (IRMO Girard, Cook County Case No. 2015-D-009633). Under that custody proceeding, notably, Applicant was not actioned with a pleading and her joinder has been implemented solely for the purposes of harassment: Applicant possesses neither a biological connection to nor parental relationship with the minor children at issue under IRMO Girard. Under these circumstances, the remand order by District Judge Jeremy C. Daniel (Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-04586, N. Dist. Illinois) under Applicant’s timely removal of those proceedings to the Northern District of Dlinois upon being served with crossclaims implicating federal questions is reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1), however the Seventh Circuit refused to conduct such review. JUDGMENT FOR WHICH REVIEW IS SOUGHT The refusal — in its order dated July 21 2025, and denying panel rehearing on August 7 2025 — by the Seventh Circuit as to conducting a review of District Judge Jeremy Daniel’s remand decision (and the implied ruling upholding such remand decision) is raised for attention by the Court. PROSPECTIVE QUESTIONS OF INTEREST The decision in question by the Seventh Circuit raises multiple immediate questions, consideration of which will ultimately inform the petition for certiorari: ' Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 922, custody proceedings are limited to 18 months in duration, unless there is a finding of good cause for an extension — which has been neither requested nor implemented. The custody proceedings in question are now entering month 43. a. Does a notice of removal have to explicitly cite 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) as one of the bases for removal in order to avail of the reviewability of a subsequent remand decision, even if the predicate requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) are manifestly satisfied by the papers and pleadings which are included together with the notice of removal? b. Should a notice of removal by a pro se litigant be construed liberally in keeping with the Court’s prior rulings on treatment of pro se papers which are inartfully pleaded such as under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106 (1976). Also see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed as to do justice.”). (on Is the “equivalent basis except