Whether a traffic stop participant's consent to continued questioning after the stop's purpose has been completed is valid when the officer's prior conduct may have objectively conveyed continued detention

No question identified. : JUDGMENT FOR WHICH REVIEW IS SOUGHT The judgment for which review is sought is the decision of the Montana Supreme Court in State of Montana v. Donna Elizabeth Summers, Case No. DA 23-0365, 2025 MT 109 (“Op.”) (attached). That decision, issued on May 27, 2025, affirmed the district court’s denial of Summers’s motion to suppress, which sought to exclude drug possession evidence found in her car following a traffic stop and questioning by the police. In her appeal, Summers argued that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment by transitioning a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation without the requisite reasonable suspicion or consent. The Montana Supreme Court agreed that the officer lacked the requisite suspicion to prolong the traffic stop or turn it into a drug investigation but held that Summers consented to additional questioning and a search of her vehicle after the officer’s actions related to the purpose of the traffic stop had concluded. JURISDICTION The judgment of the Montana Supreme Court was rendered on May 27, 2025. Summers filed a petition for rehearing, which the Montana Supreme Court denied on June 17, 2025. This Court has jurisdiction over any timely filed petition in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257(a) and 2101(d). Under Rule 13.1 of the Rules of this Court, a petition for certiorari is due to be filed in this case on or before September 15, 2025. As required by Rule 13.5, this application is being filed more than 10 days before the petition is due. BACKGROUND This petition arises from an unconstitutional search of Summers’s car following a valid and completed traffic stop. The case arose from a routine speeding stop by a Ravalli County Detective. Op. 2. After pulling Summers over, the detective checked Summers’s license and learned from police dispatch that she had no warrants, but had a history of drug possession. The detective returned Summers’s license, registration, and insurance card, and said he would “put [her] down for a warning.” Jbid. After a brief exchange about Summers’s speed and cruise control, the detective stated: “Since I got you here, do you mind if I ask you a couple of questions.” Ibid. She said “go ahead,” and the detective proceeded to engage in further questioning, culminating in a request to search Summers’s vehicle. bid. Summers said “go ahead,” and the officer found drug paraphernalia and a small bag of methamphetamine. Id. at 3-4. The state charged Summers with felony possession of dangerous drugs and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. Jd. at 4. Summers moved to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle search, arguing that the officer unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop, converting it into a drug investigation without the required reasonable suspicion. Jbid. After the district court denied the motion, Summers pleaded no contest to the charges but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling. Ibid. In a 4-3 Opinion, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Summers’s parallel challenges under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution. Id. at 5. Summers argued that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment by transitioning a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation without the requisite reasonable suspicion that Summers or her vehicle possessed drugs and without her voluntary consent to continue questioning or search her vehicle. The majority agreed that the officer lacked the requisite suspicion to prolong the traffic stop or turn it into a drug investigation. Jd. at 11-12. At the time the officer “completed the speeding warning,” the majority reasoned, “the information he had obtained from and about Summers did not give him objective indicators that she was ‘immediately involved in, or about to be involved in, criminal activity.” Jd. at 11 (citation omitted). The majority went on to reason, however, that Summers voluntarily consented to the search of her vehicle. Id. at 20-2