Whether the Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle based on independent probable cause derived from the totality of circumstances when a defendant lacks standing to challenge a tribal search warrant

No question identified. : Gnited States Court of Appeals For the Cighth Circuit No. 24-2336 United States of America Plaintiff Appellee v. Dawn Eagle Feather Floyd Defendant Appellant Appeal from United States District Court for the District of South Dakota Central Submitted: June 11, 2025 Filed: June 16, 2025 [Unpublished] Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. Dawn Eagle Feather Floyd appeals from the judgment of the district court! entered upon a jury verdict finding her guilty of drug offenses. In counseled and pro 'The Honorable Roberto Lange, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Appellate Case: 24-2336 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/16/2025 Entry ID: 5527405 se briefs, Floyd challenges the denial of her motions to suppress and the tribal search warrant that was the basis of her suppression motions. Floyd’s pro se brief also raises issues of judicial bias, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. After careful review, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Floyd’s motions to suppress. The motions were untimely. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3), (e); United States v. Trancheff, 633 F.3d 696, 697-98 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that desire to suppress incriminating evidence and retention of new counsel are insufficient bases to establish good cause to excuse untimeliness). In any event, the court correctly concluded that Floyd lacked standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the warrant, and law enforcement officers had independent probable cause to search Floyd’s vehicle based on the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 951 (8th Cir. 2007) (standard of review; explaining that this court will affirm the denial of a suppression motion unless it finds that the decision is unsupported by evidence or is based on an erroneous view of the law; or if the court is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made); see also United States v. Crawford, 93 F.Ath 436, 440 (8th Cir. 2024) (stating that, to determine whether probable cause existed to search a vehicle, this court considers “the facts and circumstances known by the police when they began the search, or the totality of the circumstances”); United States v. Wright, 844 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2016) (concluding defendant could not assert Fourth Amendments rights of another). Turning to the remainder of Floyd’s pro se arguments, we first conclude that the record does not support a judicial bias claim. See Bannister v. Delo, 100 F.3d 610, 614 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that the presiding judge is presumed impartial and a party bears the substantial burden of proving otherwise). Second, despite years of pretrial proceedings and ample opportunities to litigate the assertions, Floyd’s accusations of government misconduct also lack any support in the record. See United States v. Clayton, 787 F.3d 929, 933 (8th Cir. 2015) (explaining that claim of p= Appellate Case: 24-2336 Page:2 Date Filed: 06/16/2025 Entry ID: 5527405 prosecutorial misconduct requires a showing that the government’s conduct was improper and affected the defendant’s substantial rights so as to deprive him ofa fair trial). Last, to the extent Floyd wishes to challenge her attorneys’ effectiveness, “[t]he proper procedural mechanism for such a claim is a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” See United States v. Payton, 168 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (8th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Briggs, 820 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that “{iJneffective assistance of counsel is usually best litigated in collateral proceedings” where the record can be properly developed). Following our independent review of the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. 3 Appellate Case: 24-2336 Page:3 Date Filed: 06/16/2025 Entrv ID: 5527405