Whether a state's requirement that wine retailers establish an in-state physical presence before shipping alcoholic beverages to consumers discriminates against interstate commerce under the dormant Commerce Clause and can be justified by the Twenty-first Amendment

No question identified. : writ of certiorari will expire on November 28, 2025. The jurisdiction of this Court would be invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). 1. This case presents important and recurring questions about the intersection of the dormant Commerce Clause and Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. In Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005), this Court reaffirmed that “state regulation of alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 487. And in Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas, 588 U.S. 504 (2019), the Court reiterated that state alcohol regulation violates the dormant Commerce Clause when it is “aimed at giving a competitive advantage to in-state businesses.” Id. at 531. The Court explained that a State’s regulation of in-state alcohol distribution will survive constitutional scrutiny only if it “can be justified as a public health or safety measure or on some other legitimate nonprotectionist ground.” Id. at 539. Applying those principles, the Court deemed unconstitutional a state law that required an applicant for a license to operate a liquor store to have resided in that State for the prior two years, holding that the provision “expressly discriminates against nonresidents and has at best a highly attenuated relationship to public health or safety” and therefore “violates the Commerce Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.” Id. at 540, 543. The dissenting opinion observed that the Court’s decision left open various questions for lower courts, including whether “simple physical presence laws” are constitutional and “[h]ow much public health and safety benefit must there be” for a law to pass muster under the dormant Commerce Clause. 588 U.S. at 556 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.). Since then, the courts of appeals -including both judges on the Seventh Circuit panel in this case -have divided on precisely those issues. This case presents an opportunity for the Court to clarify whether a requirement that a retailer establish an in-state physical presence before shipping alcoholic beverages to consumers within that State discriminates against interstate commerce and, if so, whether such a provision can be saved simply because it is a feature of the State’s threetier system for alcohol regulation even if lacks a close relationship to public health or safety. 2. Applicant Chicago Wine Company, LLC, is a retailer of fine wines licensed in Illinois that ships to customers in Illinois and other states. Chicago Wine seeks to ship wine to customers in Indiana using either its own trucks and employees or a common carrier, but it cannot do so under Indiana law. The individual applicants are prospective customers who allege that Indiana law impeded their ability to order wine from out-of-state retailers. App., infra, 3a, 8a-10a, 37a-38a. Like many States, Indiana regulates the importation and distribution of alcoholic beverages through a three-tier system under which it issues different licenses to producers, wholesalers, and retailers. App., infra, 8a. Retailers must purchase alcoholic beverages from wholesalers and may sell those beverages to consumers only at retail locations or via home delivery. Ibid. In order to deliver to a customer’s residence, a retailer is required to hold a permit. See Ind. Code § 7.1-3-15-3(d) (2025). Indiana issues those permits only to retailers with physical premises in Indiana. App., infra, 5a, 9a. Indiana also prohibits retailers from shipping wine to Indiana consumers via common carriers. Id. at 29a. As a result of that scheme, out-of-state wine retailers such as Chicago Wine cannot deliver wine to Indiana consumers, but in-state wine retailers are permitted to do so. 3. Applicants filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of Indiana’s regulations under the Commerce Clause. App., infra, 37a-38a, 4la-42a. The parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment. Id. at 36a. The district court entered s