Whether a reviewing court may consider all known facts, including a radio dispatch, when assessing the totality of circumstances for reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment

No question identified. : 1. This case involves an important question regarding the constitutional standard for a police officer to conduct an investigative stop. It is well established that a police officer “may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). This Court has repeatedly advised that reasonable suspicion must be assessed based on “the totality of the circumstances.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 386 (2020). This Court’s precedents preclude a “divide-andconquer analysis” where a reviewing court gives “no weight” to a relevant fact known to officers merely because the fact “was by itself readily susceptible to an innocent explanation.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). Instead, the Court has recognized that even individually innocuous factors may combine to form reasonable suspicion, which “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Id. at 277. 2. On February 7, 2023, at around 2:00 a.m., then-15-year-old R.W. was stopped behind the wheel of a stolen vehicle. App. la-2a. A patrol officer had received a radio dispatch directing him to a specific apartment building to locate a suspicious vehicle. App. 4a, 46a-47a. As the officer approached the building’s parking lot in his marked police cruiser, he saw two individuals exit the back of a vehicle, look at his police car, and immediately begin running toward a wooded area nearby. App. 4a, 47a. The vehicle then began to back out of its parking space, even though the rear door on the driver’s side was wide open. App. 4a, 47a, 49a. The officer then exited his vehicle and ordered the driver, R.W., to show his hands. App. 4a-5a, 47a. The officer observed that the window on the open door was shattered and later noticed that the vehicle’s ignition had been “punched,” indicating the vehicle had been stolen. App. 5a, 35a, 39a, 48a, 50a. A run of the plates confirmed that the vehicle had been stolen a few days earlier. App. 5a. R.W. was placed under arrest. App. 5a. R.W. moved to suppress the evidence collected following the officer’s order to show his hands. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the officer’s initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and that the later arrest was supported by probable cause. App. 46a-52a. As to the initial stop, the court identified a number of factors known to the responding officer that combined to form reasonable suspicion. It recounted that it was almost 2:00 a.m. and that the officer was responding to a call reporting a suspicious vehicle at the specific address where R.W. was found. App. 49a. The trial court also noted that as the officer approached in his patrol car, two individuals fled “completely unprovoked” from the back of the vehicle. App. 49a. Finally, the court observed that R.W. began backing the car up to leave the parking space even though one of the doors was still wide open. App. 49a. Those facts, applying the test, amounted to reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle may have been involved in criminal activity, “at least sufficient for further inquiry.” App. 49a. R.W. sought reconsideration, which was denied. App. 3la-36a. The trial court rejected R.W.’s attempt “to isolate one factor or another and argue that such factor is not enough for reasonable articulable suspicion,” since “reasonable articulable suspicion must be examined base[d] on the totality of the circumstances.” App. 31a. Following a bench trial, R.W. was adjudicated delinquent of four charges related to the use of a stolen vehicle and received one year of probation. App. 26a-29a, 37a-43a. 3. The Court of Appeals vacated R.W.’s convictions. Adhering to its recent precedent in Mayo v. United States, 315 A.3d 606 (D.C. 2024) (en banc), the Court concluded that it was required to “