Whether there is a federal common law standard to determine the existence of a property interest in city employment, without applying state laws, requiring that such interest exists only when there is a procedural right to appeal a for cause removal decision, in contradiction of Board of Regents v. Roth and Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Respondent is a Florida municipality and its charter provided that removal of a probationary classified service employee —who was appointed from a certified reemployment listcould only be for cause. ’ The charter also required a process to hear appeals from all discharged classified service employees. In Florida, a city charter is the paramount law of a municipality, City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, ; Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 803 (Fla. 1972), acity regulation abridging such charter cannot be recognized, Baynard v. Windom, 63 So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. 1952), and a city charter conveys a property interest when it allows removal only “for cause”, Ragucci v. City of Plantation, 407 So.2d 932, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). And in this case, the parties’ collective bargaining agreement required the charter to prevail. App. 35a. Then, in a federal claim for deprivation of procedural due process, the questions presented are: 1. whether there is a federal common law standard to determine the existence of a property interest in city employment, without applying state laws, requiring that such interest exists only when there is a procedural right to appeal a for cause removal decision, in contradiction of Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, (1985). 2. whether a classified service probationary employee appointed from a certified reemployment list states a claim upon removal without any hearings with decision maker, without proper notice, when the employer created a public record stigmatizing such disputed removal and concealed the charter rights. ii ;