Whether an accommodation that merely lessens or has the potential to eliminate the conflict between work and religious practice is 'reasonable' per se, creates a jury question, or must fully eliminate the conflict to be 'reasonable'

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Title VII prohibits an employer from firing an employee for engaging in a religious practice—here, abstaining from work on his Sabbath—“unless [the] employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to” the employee’s “religious ... practice without undue hardship .” 42 U.S.C. 2000eG). This Court has not addressed the proper interpretation of the “reasonable accommodation” part of this test since Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986), or the “undue hardship” defense since TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). The federal circuits are now split over what constitutes a “reasonable” accommodation and the evidence required to establish an “undue burden” under these decisions. The questions presented are: 1. Is an accommodation that merely lessens or has the potential to eliminate the conflict between work and religious practice “reasonable” per se, as the First, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits hold, does it instead create a jury question, as the Eighth and Tenth Circuits hold, or must an accommodation fully eliminate the conflict in order to be “reasonable,” as the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits hold? 2. Is speculation about possible future burdens sufficient to meet the employer’s burden in establishing “undue hardship,” as the Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits hold, or must the employer demonstrate an actual burden, as the Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits hold? 3. Should the portion of Hardison opining that “andue hardship” simply means something more than a “de minimis cost” be disavowed or overruled?