Jose Nieves-Galarza v. United States
HabeasCorpus
Did the Third Circuit misread Castleman to erroneously require that a conviction under New York's first-degree robbery statute (N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15(1)) is a valid ACCA predicate, on the grounds that its serious physical injury' element necessarily involves the use of 'violent force?"
Question Presented For a prior conviction to qualify as a predicate for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Criminal Career Act, it must be for an offense that is a “violent felony”, defined as having “as an element the use . . . of physical force against another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)G). And that “physical force” must rise to the level of “violent foree—that is, force capable of causing pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). In United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1413-15 (2014), the Court confirmed that certain “[m]inor uses of force” do not rise to a level that satisfy the ACCA’s “violent force” requirement, and left open whether Johnson’s required causation of pain or injury by physical force must involve the use of “violent force.” The question presented is: Did the Third Circuit misread Castleman to erroneously require that a conviction under New York’s first-degree robbery statute (N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15(1)) is a valid ACCA predicate, on the grounds that its “serious physical injury” element necessarily involves the use of “violent force”? 1