Whether an antitrust plaintiff with a direct privity relationship to a price-fixer has antitrust standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, when it was injured by its participation in a market that was foreseeably affected by defendants' anticompetitive manipulation of a directly related market

QUESTION PRESENTED Respondents conspired to fix the price of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) in order to manipulate the market for LIBOR-denominated financial instruments. Because LIBOR was an enormously influential benchmark interest rate, the manipulation of LIBOR had serious and predictable effects in the market for LIBOR-denominated financial instruments and in related financial markets that predictably reacted to changes in LIBOR. The question presented is: Whether an antitrust plaintiff with a direct privity relationship to a price-fixer has antitrust standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, when it was injured by its participation in a market that was foreseeably affected by defendants’ anticompetitive manipulation of a directly related market. ii RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 7 West 57th Street Realty Company, LLC has no parent corporation, and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.