Melvyn Perry Sprowson, Jr. v. Nevada
AdministrativeLaw FirstAmendment DueProcess HabeasCorpus Privacy JusticiabilityDoctri
Whether a state regulation of child pornography that fails to satisfy all four requirements set forth in Ferber and that criminalizes conduct that is neither 'obscene nor the product of sexual abuse' is facially unconstitutional and/or overbroad?
QUESTION PRESENTED Nevada defines “child pornography” to include any depiction of a minor that “appeals to a shameful or morbid interest in the sexuality of the minor and which does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, according to the views of an average person applying contemporary community standards”. Yet, this definition of “child pornography” violates New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), because it is not “limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct of children below a specified age” and because it does not suitably limit and describe “the category of sexual conduct proscribed”. The definition also violates Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 232 (2002), by criminalizing conduct that is neither “obscene nor the product of sexual abuse.” Therefore, this petition presents the following question: Whether a state regulation of child pornography that fails to satisfy all four requirements set forth in Ferber and that criminalizes conduct that is neither “obscene nor the product of sexual abuse” is facially unconstitutional and/or overbroad? -ii