Whether the secondary boycott provision of the National Labor Relations Act prohibits peaceful and non-coercive Union inducement of workers to leave their jobs in support of a lawful labor dispute in violation of the First Amendment

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Petitioner was subject to an order of the National Labor Relations Board enforced by the court below because a business agent asked employees to cease working in support of a dispute between a different union and a different employer on the same job. Only a labor organization within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and no other entity can be found to have engaged in unlawful secondary boycotting by making this request to the employees. The employees themselves have the right to leave the job. Any other person could have made the same request. This case is about whether the Court’s current First Amendment jurisprudence applies to the content of labor speech. Nearly 70 years ago, this Court decided a labor case which included dicta that such speech can be prohibited. The Court did not apply any level of scrutiny. Since this Court decided that case, its First Amendment jurisprudence has evolved tremendously, applying free speech protections to all persons. This case now presents the issue whether labor speech is the only exception simply because it is regulated by the NLRA. The Question Presented is: Whether the secondary boycott provision of the National Labor Relations Act prohibiting peaceful and non-coercive Union inducement of workers to leave their jobs in support of a lawful labor dispute violates the First Amendment where the restriction is content based, speaker based, view point discriminatory and where there is no effort to justify the speech restriction under strict scrutiny?