Does the statutory definition of ATDS encompass any device that can 'store' telephone numbers, even if the device does not 'us[e] a random or sequential number generator?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) prohibits calls made to a cellular phone without consent using an “automatic telephone dialing system” (“ATDS”), which is defined as “equipment which has the capacity . . . to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator ... and to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). In Duran v. La Boom Disco, Inc., the Second Circuit concluded an ATDS encompasses any device that can store and dial telephone numbers—even if it cannot store or produce them “using a random or sequential number generator,” as required by the statute. It also disregarded significant human intervention required to send a text message through the devices, ignoring the “automatic” requirement. This decision—which conflicts with opinions from the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits—expands the TCPA’s application to almost any call from any modern smartphone. This Court has already granted certiorari to address the proper interpretation of an ATDS in Duguid v. Facebook, Inc. This appeal should be consolidated with that one, but is also independently worthy of review to address the level of automation required to constitute an ATDS, as well as whether the Second Circuit violated the Hobbs Act by relying upon Federal Communications Commission orders invalidated by the D.C. Circuit. The questions presented are: 1. Does the statutory definition of ATDS encompass any device that can “store” telephone numbers, ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED—Continued even if the device does not “us[e] a random or sequential number generator”? 2. Does a device that requires significant human intervention to initiate telephone calls and/or send text messages qualify as “automatic” under the TCPA? 3. Is the Hobbs Act violated when a circuit court of appeals relies upon orders by the Federal Communications Commission that were previously invalidated by another circuit court of appeals presiding over an appeal of an Federal Communications Commission ruling under the Hobbs Act?