Does a prior offense categorically qualify as a violent felony under ACCA's force clause if it only requires a use of 'intimidation' that can be satisfied by the offender's impersonation of an authority figure, or based solely on the victim's subjective, generalized feeling of 'being intimidated' without any threat of physical force?

QUESTION PRESENTED The “force clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) defines “violent felony” as a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” This Court has clarified that “the phrase ‘physical force’ means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person,” explicitly distinguishing other forms of non-physical force, such as “intellectual force or emotional force.” United States v. Johnson, 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010). Louisiana’s robbery statute criminalizes unlawful takings accomplished by the “use of force or intimidation.” Louisiana caselaw makes it clear that the “force or intimidation” element is satisfied when a defendant impersonates a police officer and presents an intimidating “aura of authority” to procure the victim’s property. Louisiana caselaw also makes it clear that the intimidation element can be satisfied based solely on a victim’s subjective and nonspecific feeling of “being intimidated” without any actual threat by the offender. Thus, the question presented is: Does a prior offense categorically qualify as a violent felony under ACCA’s force clause if it only requires a use of “intimidation” that can be satisfied by the offender’s impersonation of an authority figure, or based solely on the victim’s subjective, generalized feeling of “being intimidated” without any threat of physical force? ii