Whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in misquoting the plaintiff's complaint and incorrectly opining that the plaintiff alleged the union breached its duty of fair representation by declining to advance the grievance to arbitration, when the plaintiff never made that argument because the union had already secretly settled and dismissed the grievance without the plaintiff's knowledge

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In this "hybrid § 301" claim brought under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for exercise of this Court's supervisory power.” 1. Badkin filed this court action against Lockheed Corporation for his wrongful termination in breach of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA); and against the Union’s for breach of its duty of fair representation for "handling his grievance arbitrarily, perfunctorily, discriminatorily, dishonestly, and in bad faith with a reckless disregard for Badkin’s rights." Badkin testified during his deposition that several months earlier he had problems at work with Lockheed when he had complained about certain hazardous electrical safety violations and that the Union had not supported him against Lockheed at that time. During the oral arguments at the Court of Appeals, Badkin's attorney focused on the record of the Union's handling his grievance "arbitrarily, perfunctorily, discriminatorily, dishonestly, and in bad faith with a reckless disregard for Badkin’s rights" by focusing on the Union's contradictory after-the-fact declaration on it's allegations why it failed to take the grievance to arbitration even though Badkin never argued about the Union's failure to take the grievance to arbitration — because the Union had secretly settled and agreed with Lockheed and dismissed Badkin's grievance without his knowledge long time earlier. Yet, in its memorandum ruling, the Court of Appeals misquoted what Badkin was asking in his complaint and incorrectly opined that "Badkin alleges ... (2) the Union i breached its duty of fair representation by declining to advance Badkin's grievance to arbitration” — even though Badkin never argued about the Union's failure to take the grievance to the arbitration because the Union had already secretly settled with Lockheed and dismissed Badkin's grievance without his knowledge. 2. Badkin could not afford to retain a powerful / expensive law firm for his complaint against the large and powerful Lockheed Corporation and against the Union because he was wrongfully terminated and unemployed with no income. Instead, Badkin could afford to retain only a solo practice, pro bono attorney, to face such a large corporation and the Union, who could afford powerful law firms. No reasonable jury would disagree with the proposition that if Badkin could have afforded an expensive/ powerful law firm, the lower courts would not have overlooked the merits of Badkin’s grievance and the Union’s breach of its duty of fair representation. The words of Justice Hugo Black apply here: "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." Justice Hugo Black in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Badkin respectfully asks this Court to grant his petition because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial ; proceedings as to call for exercise of this Court's supervisory power.”