Does the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause apply to and invalidate North Carolina's law allowing only in-state retailers to ship wine to consumers, or is the law constitutional under the Twenty-first Amendment because the Commerce Clause does not apply to laws regulating retail wine distribution?

QUESTION PRESENTED This Court has repeatedly held that the Twentyfirst Amendment is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause. A state law that protects local liquor interests from interstate competition is unconstitutional unless the State presents concrete evidence that discriminating against out-of-state entities is reasonably necessary to protect public health and safety. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S.Ct. 2449, 2470 (2019); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487 (2005); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 342 (1989); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984). Departing from these precedents, the Fourth Circuit (over a strong dissent) upheld a discriminatory North Carolina wineshipping law without subjecting it to Commerce Clause scrutiny. It held that the Twenty-first Amendment gave states authority to regulate retail wine distribution that was not limited by the nondiscrimination principle. The question, upon which the circuits disagree, is: Does the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause apply to and invalidate North Carolina’s law allowing only in-state retailers to ship wine to consumers, or is the law constitutional under the Twenty-first Amendment because the Commerce Clause does not apply to laws regulating retail wine distribution?