Whether 'disorderly' and 'disruptive' in 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2) and 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(D) narrow the types of conduct criminalized, or refer only to the conduct's effect under the circumstances

QUESTION PRESENTED This case involves two federal statutes that criminalize conduct in settings where conduct often doubles as political expression: places where the President, Vice President, or another Secret Service protectee is present (18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2)), and the Capitol Buildings and Grounds (40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(D)). Each defines a crime with the same actus reus: “engag[ing] in disorderly or disruptive conduct... .” The court of appeals, reasoning that “almost no conduct is always and innately disruptive or disorderly,” Pet. App. lla, held that almost any conduct—even mere physical presence—may qualify as disorderly or disruptive, depending on the context. Mr. Alford presents this question: In § 1752(a)(2)’s and § 5104(e)(2)(D)’s prohibitions against “disorderly or disruptive” conduct, do “disorderly” and “disruptive” narrow the types of conduct criminalized, or do those adjectives refer only to conduct’s effect under the circumstances, so that even mere presence may violate the statutes?