Ethel "Laverne" McVae, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Marcus McVae, Deceased, et al. v. Jesse Perez
SocialSecurity FourthAmendment CriminalProcedure JusticiabilityDoctri
Whether it is clearly established under the Fourth Amendment that a law enforcement officer may not use deadly force against an unarmed, fleeing person who poses no immediate threat to the officer or others, as determined by the totality of the circumstances
Nearly four decades ago, this Court drew a constitutional line: law enforcement may not use deadly force against an unarmed, fleeing suspect who poses no immediate threat to officers or the public. Tennessee v. Garner , 471 U.S. 1 (1985), made clear that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard demands a careful balance —the sanctity of human life weighed against the government’s interest in effective policing. Relying on United States v. Place , 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the Court emphasized that the totality of the circumstances must justify such a seizure. Garner , 471 U.S. at 8 –9. That line, once bright, has grown dangerously blurred. This case asks whether that constitutional promise still holds true. When an officer fatally shoots an unarmed person in the back as he runs away, absent any immediate threat, does the Fourth Amendment protect his right to live? Or have the expanding contours of qualified immunity and fractured lower court interpretations of the “moment of threat” doctrine effectively erased the limits this Court once so clearly defined? This petition presents an urgent and recurring constitutional question: Whether it is clearly established under the Fourth Amendment that a law enforcement officer may not use deadly force against an unarmed, fleeing person who poses no immediate threat to the officer or others, as determined by the totality of the circumstances.