Can a reviewing court substitute a finding of VICAR's purpose clause for the categorical analysis of whether the elements of its predicate state or federal crime includes the targeted, violent physical force that Borden requires?

QUESTION PRESENTED Section 924(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code criminalizes carrying a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence.” Per this Court’s precedent, that predicate crime of violence must have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” purposefully targeted “against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A); see Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420, 424 (2021); United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 470 (2019). To assess whether the predicate crime satisfies that criterion, courts apply the categorical approach to the crime’s elements to assess whether they necessarily require that purposeful direction of force. The violent crimes in aid of racketeering (VICAR) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959, criminalizes, inter alia, the commission of murder and maiming “in violation of the laws of any State or the United States” for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing position in a racketeering enterprise. § 1959(a). As one element of a VICAR offense is a violation of a state or federal statute, the elements of a VICAR offense include the elements of that state or federal predicate crime. When reviewing a § 924(c) conviction predicated on a VICAR offense, the Fourth Circuit formerly applied the categorical approach to the state or federal offense on which the VICAR offense was predicated while determining whether the VICAR offense qualifies as a crime of violence. The Fourth Circuit has lately concluded that VICAR’s purpose clause satisfies Borden’s required mens rea and i renders such an analysis superfluous, United States v. Thomas, 87 F.4th 267 (4th Cir. 2023). Its shift has created a split with the Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. The question presented is: Can a reviewing court substitute a finding of VICAR’s purpose clause for the categorical analysis of whether the elements of its predicate state or federal crime includes the targeted, violent physical force that Borden requires?! 1The question presented in this case is nearly identical to the question presented in the pending petition for writ of certiorari in Thomas v. United States, No. 23-1168, which stems from the Fourth Circuit’s decision adopting its new approach. This Court has also granted certiorari in the case of Delligatti v. United States, No. 23-825, which presented the question of “[w]hether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” As this Court’s decisions as to Thomas and Delligatti will likely inform its consideration of Mr. Tipton’s petition, he respectfully proposes that his petition be held for consideration concurrently with or after this Court resolves those matters. il